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The "Loyalist" Economy of Upper Canada, 
1784-1806* 
Douglas McCALLA * * 
This paper surveys the first twenty years of the Upper Canadian economy and its 
development in the wake of the initial Loyalist settlements. Referring to evidence on 
population growth, wheat prices, British government expenditures, exports, agricultural 
development, the domestic market, and the nature of the colonial business system, it dis-
cusses the forces for growth in this economy. No one factor can explain the development 
that took place in the period, though the paper stresses the investment process , particularly 
as embodied in immigration and in the creation of new farms; reasons for patterns here 
are sought in the presumed expectations of new settlers, in conjunction with their experience 
once involved in the economy. The paper argues for long-term continuities in patterns of 
growth for Upper Canada, from this period to c. 1850, as indicated in wheat output and 
exports per capita, land cultivated per capita, rates of population growth, the role of the 
trade cycle , and the nature of the business system that sustained the development 
that went on. 
L 'auteur s'interroge ici sur les facteurs de croissance de l'economie du Haul-
Canada au cours des vingt premieres annees d'existence de Ia province, qui furent mar-
quees par l'arrivee des Loyalistes . Des facteurs pris en consideration- croissance demo-
graphique, prix du bte, depenses publiques de Ia metropole dans Ia province, expor-
tations, developpement agricole, marche interieur et nature du reseau commercial en regime 
colonial - aucun ne suffit , isolement, ii expliquer /'expansion survenue au cours de Ia 
periode. L'auteur insiste cependant sur les rouages d'investissement par le biais de 
/'immigration et de l'etablissement de nouvelles exploitations agricoles; it cherche de plus 
ii degager des modeles explicatifs fondes sur les attentes presumees des nouveaux colons 
et sur leur experience concrete des conditions locales. La production de bte et les expor-
tations par tete, Ia quantile de terre cultivee par habitant, les taux de croissance demo-
graphique, le role du cycle des affaires et Ia nature du systeme commercial qui soutenaient 
le developpement en cours conduisent /'auteur ii voir des continuites ii long terme dans les 
modeles de croissance du Haut-Canada, depuis Ia periode etudiee jusque vers 1850. 
Opening a new frontier and beginning a new regional economy are 
characteristic themes in the history of eighteenth and nineteenth century 
North America. Bringing the relatively scarce resources of capital and 
labour to the relatively abundant lands of each new frontier in one sense 
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represents the quite simple economic process of "extensive growth", 1 
but in another sense involves a complex historical process, in which the 
specific timing and sequence of events need to be explained for each 
particular region. 2 Such new regional development is often seen as being 
dependent on the export of one or a few staple resource products, which 
could be used by new settlers to buy from more established areas the other 
goods they required for survival. 3 In fact it took years before a staple ex-
port could be established, and it was necessary for the pioneer to buy re-
quired goods even before he had a staple to sell in significant amounts. 
Thus, it is usually said to have taken around three years for a farmer to 
become "self-sufficient", and, given normal rates of land clearing, ten 
years for his farm to be relatively well-developed. 4 Even merchants in a 
colonial economy needed to make predictions of a quite long-term nature. 
For an inland territory such as Upper Canada, it was necessary to send 
orders out in the fall of one year for delivery in the early summer of the 
next; even if sales followed at once, payment still could not be expected at 
least until the harvest in the summer of the year following. 5 Much could 
change even in two years, let alone ten. Those who actually opened new 
regions clearly took a considerable chance when they staked their lives and 
fortunes on a relatively uncertain territory. To know why they did so, we 
really need to know something of how they saw the future; their expecta-
tions and actions combined with forces from the established economic 
world to produce an economy with a specific structure and character in a 
particular area and at a particular time. 6 
l. J. H. DALES, The Protective Tariff in Canada's Development (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1966), pp. 154-58; see also J.D. GouLD, Economic Growth in History 
(London: Methuen, 1972), pp. 102-5. 
2. For a review of the abundant literature generated by another such extensive 
boom in Canadian history, see K. NoRRIE "The National Policy and the Rate of Prairie 
Settlement: A Review", Journal of Canadian Studies, XIV (Fall 1979): 63-76. 
3. For a sophisticated statement of this view, see J. F. SHEPHERD and G. WALTON, 
Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), esp. p. 25. 
4. T. F. MciLWRAITH, "The Logistical Geography of the Great Lakes Grain Trade, 
1820-1850" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1973), p. 70. In his "Upper Canada: 
A Poor Man's Country? Some Statistical Evidence", Canadian Papers in Rural History, III 
(1982): 129-47, Peter RussELL has recently called into question the usually accepted rate of 
clearing (4 to 5 acres per year), at least for the post-pioneer phase of settlement and after 
1812. His approach (not explained in the paper) yields a "rate of clearing" of as low as 1.2 
to 1.5 acres per year. The data below for population and land under cultivation suggest, how-
ever, that this rate is too low for the pre-1806 period; for example, even on assumptions 
highly favourable to such a lower figure, this rate would require the "average" Upper 
Canadian farm in 1805-06 to have been started no later than c. 1792. 
5. See Edith FIRTH, ed., The Town of York 1793-1815 (foronto : University of 
Toronto Press for the Champlain Society, 1962), pp. lvii-lviii. 
6. On the issue of expectations and attitudes, see James HENRETT A, "Social History 
as Lived and Written", American Historical Review, LXXXIV (1979): 1310-14; and W.B. 
ROTHENBERG, "The Market and Massachusetts Farmers, 1750-1855", Journal of Economic 
History (hereafter JEH), XLI (1981): 284-87, 312-13. See also Bruce S. ELLIOTT, "'The 
Famous Township of Hull': Image and Aspirations of a Pioneer Quebec Community", His-
loire sociale-Social History (hereafter HS-SH), XII (1979): 339-45. 
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The story of the opening of Upper Canada by the Loyalists is, in 
broad outlines, a relatively familiar one. 7 The newly arrived Loyalists 
took up lands along the upper St Lawrence and in the Niagara area in 
1784-85, were sufficiently established by 1786 no longer to have to rely on 
government rations, and thereafter quite rapidly built an economy that was 
in a number of respects very successful. This swift progress is impressive 
in that the Loyalists faced not only the usual problems of opening a new 
frontier-the privations, the relatively greater uncertainties, and the sheer 
hard work - but also further difficulties engendered by the forced nature 
of their emigration, which may have had both positive and negative psy-
chological aspects, which must certainly have had financial difficulties 
associated with it, and which also may have brought them to the settlement 
frontier in some sense prematurely. To overcome these problems, they 
were helped by the considerable support of the British government. As 
Francis Gore observed in 1812, "the Parent State['s] ... fostering care 
[was] the first cause, under Providence, of the uninterrupted happiness 
you have so long enjoyed." 8 Modern authorities have agreed. As the 
most authoritative of recent writers, Bruce Wilson, has noted, "the most 
obvious reason for the rapid development of settlement ... was the mas-
sive aid the settlers had received from the British government." 9 
There is, however, some question to be raised here, for Upper 
Canadian development has also been seen as exemplifying the general 
process of frontier expansion. The fact that so many of those who followed 
the Loyalists were Americans and the near-contemporaneous development 
of western New York lend support to this view. 10 But western New 
York lacked the fructifying influence of British governmental largesse ; 
nonetheless it developed anyway. Perhaps then the independently causal 
significance of British support to Upper Canada has been exaggerated. 
Whatever the role of government, Upper Canada did eventually make a 
transition to a wheat-based economy, though precisely when that occurred 
is less certain-just before or shortly after the War of 1812 being the 
most common times suggested. 11 
While it has been usual to see early Upper Canada as an economic 
success story, most accounts of its history have paradoxically placed 
equal or greater stress on what it lacked: the "impediments" to develop-
ment, the "shortage of capital", and the "obstacles to economic progress" 
7. See G. M. CRAIG, Upper Canada: The Formative Years, 1784-1841 (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1963), chap. 1. 
8. UPPER CANADA, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, Journals (hereafter UCJ), 1812, printed 
in ONTARIO BuREAU OF ARCHIVES (hereafter OBA), Ninth Report (1912), p. 4. 
9. Bruce WILSON, As She Began: An Illustrated Introduction to Loyalist Ontario 
(Toronto : Dundurn Press, 1981), p. 107. 
10. See D. M. ELLIS, "Rise of the Empire State, 1790-1820", New York History, 
LVI (1975): 5-27. 
11. R. L. JONES, History of Agriculture in Ontario 16/3-1880 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1946), p. 32. For a view of the war as the crucial transitional phase, see 
F. M. QUEALEY, "The Administration of Sir Peregrine Maitland" (Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Toronto, 1968), pp. 4-6. 
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that apparently slowed its growth. I2 Bruce Wilson captures the tone of 
such explanations: "inadequate communications and limited markets, 
fluctuating prices and low returns stunted the growth of most ... enter-
prises." IJ But this is an approach that highlights what was not happening, 
rather than what was. It is difficult to explain what happened in terms of 
what did not, or by reference to standards set in a future that the immi-
grants themselves did not know. Indeed, such a negative viewpoint calls 
into question the rationality not only of those who came to Upper Canada 
(particularly those who followed the Loyalists), but of those who stayed 
there in preference to going somewhere else, with, for example, better 
communications and less limited markets. 
In light of these issues, there is clearly justification for re-examining 
the economy the Loyalists and those who followed them made in 
Upper Canada, both to understand more precisely how it functioned, 
not to say survived, and to assess the timing and the significance of 
various factors in its structure and growth. The province's early develop-
ment occurred at a time of rapid development and structural changes 
in adjacent economies. Not only was western New York beginning to be 
settled, but areas nearer the coast such as Massachusetts were, between 
1791 and 1805, undergoing a process of what Winnifred Rothenberg has 
termed '"Deep Change' in virtually every measurable social indicator". I 4 
In Lower Canada, agriculture was developing very rapidly between 1785 
and 1802. IS A terminal date for the present paper in the years just after 
1800 is therefore a reasonable one, and it is also suggested by Upper 
Canada's emergence then as a wheat exporter, by wheat price cycles, and 
by the availability of appropriate population data. Taking stock of the 
economy's initial establishment also avoids the temptation simply to see 
the early period as background to the War of 1812. As there is a "relative 
lack of statistical information" that would permit an overview of the work-
ings of the entire economy, I 6 it is necessary to draw on the sometimes 
fragmentary data surviving on population, prices, British expenditure, ex-
ternal trade, internal exchange, and the commercial system and its insti-
tutions in order to clarify timing, structures, and causation. 
12. Quotes are from Gary TEEPLE, "Land, Labour and Capital in Pre-Confederation 
Canada" in Capitalism and the National Question in Canada, ed.: Gary TEEPLE (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 48; Leo JoHNSON, "The Settlement of the Western 
District 1749-1850" in Aspects of Nineteenth-Century Ontario, eds: F. H. ARMSTRONG et al. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 23; CRAIG, Upper Canada, p. 53. 
13. Bruce Wilson, "The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton: A Study of Wealth and 
Influence in Early Upper Canada: 1776-1812" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1978), 
p. 2. In fairness to Wilson, it should be noted that in its specific context this comment is not 
unreasonable, as he uses it as part of explaining the exceptional nature of Hamilton's business; 
but the remark serves to point to the degree to which accounts that stress barriers and vicis-
situdes typify the literature on early Upper Canada. 
14. ROTHENBERG, "The Market and Massachusetts Farmers", p. 289. 
15. Fernand OuELLET, Lower Canada 1791-/840 : Social Change and Nationalism 
(Toronto : McClelland and Stewart, 1980), pp. 30-38, 349-50. See also regarding this period 
in North America W. B. SMITH and A. H. CoLE, Fluctuations in American Business 1790-/860 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935), pp. xxiii, 31. 
16. WILSON, "The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton", p. 348. 
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An understanding of population growth is the first essential in this 
inquiry. 17 For present purposes, that is, an understanding of the growth of 
a European economy in Upper Canada, it seems preferable to omit the 
Indian population, despite its relative numerical significance in the earliest 
period. To the extent that Indians were involved in their more traditional 
economic activities, their economy remained distinct from the new settle-
ment economy, as did the self-sufficient parts of any newly developing In-
dian agriculture. Population locations and numbers, especially for the re-
moter bands, are also somewhat conjectural. Then too, to the extent that 
the European goods that the Indians acquired came in the form of presents, 
these were not purchased in Upper Canada and had only very limited links 
to the patterns of the new agricultural economy. 
With this qualification in mind, it is possible to estimate the initial 
population of Loyalist settlers at about 6,000 by the fall of 1785, of which 
at least two-thirds were located between the Bay of Quinte and the soon-to-
be-established border with Lower Canada. 18 The most commonly met 
and reasonable figure for 1791 is 14,000, though one recent authority 
says, without explanation, that the figure was 20,000 to 30,000 by then. 19 
Militia returns suggest a population of 20,000 to 25,000 by 1794, and it 
is clear that something like the latter figure was taken by informed con-
temporaries to be the population by 1795-%: the agreement for dividing 
customs revenues with Lower Canada assumed, on the basis of compara-
tive militia returns, that Upper Canada had one-seventh of the lower 
province's population. 20 
Assessment and other data permit a more comprehensive look at the 
province's population in 1805-06, when totals are available for six of the 
eight Upper Canadian districts. Unfortunately, the two missing districts, 
the Eastern and Niagara Districts, were among the three oldest and most 
populous sections of the province. The former had reached almost 1,600 
households by 1812, and this suggests, for 1805-06, a figure of between 1,100 
and 1,400 households; if the average size of a household was six, then 
17. On this point see Jo-Ann FELLOWS, "The Possibilities for Quantitatively-
Oriented Research on the Loyalists in Canada" in Red, White and True Blue, ed.: E. WRIGHT 
(New York: AMS Press, 1976), pp. 169-74. 
18. WILSON , As She Began , pp. 13, 120. Wallace BROWN, The Good Americans: The 
Loyalists in the American Revolution (New York: Morrow, 1969), p. 192. 
19. Helen I. CowAN, British Emigration to British North America: The First Hun-
dred Years, rev. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp. 9-11, is the source 
for the lower figure. The higher figure is from WILSON, As She Began , p. 95. 
20. E. A. CRUIKSHANK, ed., The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves 
Simcoe (hereafter Simcoe Correspondence), 5 vols (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 
1923-31), II: 293, Militia Return, June 1794; IV: 80-82, Report of Upper Canadian Com-
missioners regarding the agreement between the provinces regarding sharing of duties, 1795. 
For Lower Canada's population, see Ouellet, Lower Canada 1791-1840, p. 8. The defective-
ness of the militia returns was, however, a matter of common comment; see E. A. CRUIK-
SHANK and A. F. HUNTER, eds, The Correspondence of the Honourable Peter Russell (here-
after Russell Correspondence), 3 vols (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society 1932-36), I: 119, 
Russell to Simcoe, 1 January 1797. 
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the Eastern District population must have been between 6,500 and 8,500. 
A population range for Niagara can be estimated from assessment data 
for Niagara and other districts in 1805, because such items as oxen, cows, 
horses, and mills must have been relatively similarly distributed in the 
various districts. 21 While no one indicator offers an entirely satisfactory 
result, it is possible to estimate a population range of 10,000 to 12,000 
for Niagara, a figure that seems compatible with D. W. Smith's estimate 
for Niagara in 1798-99 of 6,000. 22 With these adjustments, it is possible 
to estimate Upper Canada's population in 1805-06 at 44,000 to 48,000 
(Table 1). 
Table 1 Estimated Population of Upper Canada 
by District, 1805-06 
District 
Eastern 
Johnstown 
Midland 
Newcastle 
Home 
Niagara 
London 
Western 
Total 
Approximate 
Population 
7,5003 
4,900 
8,200 
2,000 
3,800 
11,000b 
5,300 
3,200 
45,900C 
Percentage 
of the Total 
16 
11 
18 
4 
8 
24 
12 
7 
100 
Sources: Public Archives of Ontario (hereafter PAO), F.P. Smith Papers, pkg. 23, MU 2831 
(for Johnstown district); Public Archives of Canada (hereafter PAC), MG II, microfilm of the 
Colonial Office Records, CO 42/347/189-90 (for Midland District); PAC, Upper Canada 
Population and Assessment Returns, RG 5, B-26, pp. I, 6, 771, 774, 776, 779-80, 784 (for 
Eastern, Niagara and other districts). 
a Average of population range estimated from 6,500 to 8,500. 
b Average of population range estimated from 10,000 to 12,000. 
c Average of population range estimated from 43,900 to 47,900. 
21. Niagara can best be compared to three other districts, the Home, Johnstown, 
and Newcastle. Ratios among districts for items rated by assessors vary, as do ratios of 
such items to population. For these districts, the most consistent ratios are found for oxen, 
and if the ratio of oxen to people (0.164 to 0.177 to one) for the other three districts is applied 
to Niagara, the resultant estimates for Niagara's population fall between 11,100 and 11,900. 
Data are also available for the Midland District, but oxen and horse numbers here are dif-
ferent from patterns for the other three districts used here ; · however, data on mills, land 
cultivated, cows owned, etc. yield more consistent ratios with equivalent Niagara data, and 
if used to estimate a population for Niagara would yield a figure of about 9,500. For present 
purposes, these seem satisfactory levels of approximation. 
22. Cited by WiLSON, "The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton", pp. 81-82. If popula-
tion grew at an average annual rate of 7 percent (Table 2), such an estimate for 1798 would 
yield an 1805 population of about 9,600. 
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The population of the province on the eve of the War of 1812 
is usually given as 75,000 to 80,000, 23 but this is based on an estimate 
by Barnabas Bidwell, using assessment data that indicated that there were 
9,600 households in the colony in 1811. As Robert Gourlay noted and as 
later demographic research on the period has also suggested, an average 
household size of eight persons was exceptionally high. 24 If we use a 
figure of six persons per household, which is appropriate to a growing 
immigrant society for the time, then the population in 1811 was something 
closer to 60,000, a figure that seems more reasonable in light of what 
is known about post-war populations. With these estimates in mind, the 
early population history of Upper Canada can be briefly summarized 
(Table 2). 
Table 2 
Year 
1785 
1791 
1796 
1805-06 
1811 
Upper Canadian Population Growth, 
1785-1811 
Approximate 
Population 
Annual Average Rate 
of Increase (%) 
6,000 
14,000 
25,000 
46,000 
60,000 
15 
12 
7 
5 
Because these figures are all approximations, in varying degrees, it is 
unwise to place excessive weight on any one of them. Nor do they allow 
dating the flow of immigration with the precision that one might wish. 
Natural rates of increase in such fast-growing colonial societies were 
between 2 and 3 percent per year, and rates of increase between 5 and 
15 percent are thus sufficient to indicate the continuing significance of 
immigration throughout the period to 1812. 25 Indeed, it should be noted 
that the indicated rates of increase are quite comparable to the average 
rate of 7 percent per annum for Upper Canada during the great era of 
immigration, 1821-51. The significance of the implied levels of net immigra-
tion can only be suggested here, but it is important to note that the largest 
proportion of newcomers came from the United States, whether Loyalists, 
"late Loyalists", or merely land-seekers. Probably three-quarters of the 
23. For example , CRAIG, Upper Canada, p. 51. 
24. Robert GouRLAY, Statistical Account of Upper Canada, ed.: S. R. MEALING, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), pp. 96, 287; D. A. NoRRIS, "Household and 
Transiency in a Loyalist Township: The People of Adolphustown, 1784-1822", HS-SH, 
XIII (1980): 403. See also Public Archives of Canada (hereafter PAC), RG 5, A-1, Upper 
Canada Sundries, 13/5437-38, Annual return of Upper Canadian militia, 4 June 1811. 
25. OUELLET, Lower Canada 1791-1840, p. 8; M. EGNAL,"Economic Development in 
the American Colonies", William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., XXXII (1975): 193-97. 
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population in 1812 was of American background. Such people had choices 
to make in their destinations, and they were not uninformed. 26 The 
continuing selection of Upper Canada as a destination suggests, therefore, 
that the development the province was undergoing gave some settlers 
cause to predict future success for themselves and those with whom they 
were in contact in the United States. 
For early Upper Canada as for other times and territories , it is 
apparent that transiency was also an important component of the demo-
graphic picture. In Adolphustown over any two-year period between 1793 
and 1822, some one-quarter of all household heads changed status within 
the household, died, or left the township. 27 There was a continuing need 
for immigration, then, just to maintain the existing household structure 
even in such a relatively "mature" township. While one cannot know 
where transients went on leaving an area such as Adolphustown, it is clear 
that a decision to immigrate to Upper Canada was not irreversible, nor 
was it necessary (or sometimes even possible) to remain in a location 
that became relatively unpropitious economically. That is, the fact of 
transiency reminds us that even those who stayed were making a decision, 
and it may be possible to infer something about their perceptions from 
this fact. In this regard it should also be remembered that even Loyalists 
were not barred, at least after the earliest years, from returning to the 
United States. 28 
Almost all of this population was rural. Neither York nor Kingston, 
the colony's leading centres , had reached 1,000 people by 1806, and even 
when other incipient urban centres are included in an estimate, it is clear 
that Upper Canada was at least 95 percent rural ; 29 in fact , although it had 
been politically detached from Lower Canada in 1791, most of its required 
urban services were provided through Montreal. Despite Upper Canada's 
inland remoteness , its rural nature , and the apparent isolation of the 
pioneer farmer, short-term and seasonal movements of people in response 
to changing economic opportunity are evident. 30 Adult males outnumbered 
adult females by a ratio of between 1.2 and 1.3 to one throughout 
this era of pioneering; that is, the labour market was able to deliver 
appropriate labour to areas where it was in demand. Some of the signifi-
cance of these points will become evident when the weight and workings of 
the Upper Canadian business system are considered below. 
26. PAC, RG 5, A-1, 2/601-3, W. D. Powell ' s Summary of the Rise and Progress of 
Upper Canada, 27 May 1801. 
27. NoRRIS, " Household and Transiency" , p. 406. 
28 . BROWN, The Good Americans, p. 179. 
29. Compare G. M. WALTON and J. F . SHEPHERD, The Economic Rise of Early 
America (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 42, 50. 
30. NoRRIS, " Household and Transiency" , p . 415 ; ELLIOTT, "'The Famous Town-
ship of Hull '" , p. 342 ; see also Public Archives of Ontario (hereafter PAO), Richard Cart-
wright, Jr. Letterbook, 1793-96, MS 43, Richard Cartwright, Jr, to Todd, McGill & Co., 
1 November 1793 , and Cartwright to Robert Hamilton, 21 November 1793. 
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While the population data during the first twenty years of Upper 
Canada's economy show a relatively clear trend, data on wheat prices 
show a more complex, essentially cyclical pattern (Figure 1). Two relatively 
clear wheat price cycles mark the economy's first twenty years: the first 
with its trough about 1793-95, the second around 1802-04. As Figure 1 indi-
cates, these cycles had at least rough parallels in those at Montreal. 31 Their 
amplitude and their precise timing were sufficiently different, however, to 
suggest that, while there were clear links among the cycles, there were 
also uniquely Upper Canadian elements to each cycle. The relative small-
ness of the Upper Canadian market, lags caused by the speed at which 
information travelled, 32 and bottlenecks in the transportation system must 
have been among the factors involved here, along with local patterns of 
supply, demand, and cost in the years before Upper Canada was a clear net 
exporter downriver of wheat. 
As early as 1793 it is evident that on the Upper St Lawrence wheat 
prices were ordinarily lower than in Montreal, and the extent of the gap 
between the Montreal and Brockville-Kingston prices must indicate the 
real costs of market uncertainties, information lags, and actual shipment 
downriver. 33 The apparent lack of impact of the 1789 peak in prices at 
Montreal on the Niagara price is puzzling, and limitations of data may be 
the real issue here. It is noteworthy, however, that 1789 was a "hungry 
year" in Upper Canada. 34 Although the implication usually drawn from 
this is that Upper Canada remained very near the margin of subsistence 
and simply did not produce enough wheat (which may be true), it is also 
possible that the story was more complex: high prices outside the province 
might both have deterred importers and influenced any holders of wheat 
stocks in Upper Canada to hold out for higher prices than most Upper 
Canadians felt they could afford. The 1801 peak apparently had a greater 
impact on volumes shipped than on prices, at least when the latter are 
presented on an annual basis. There is ample evidence of a brief upsurge 
in prices -and a major bottleneck in shipping capacity that sharply raised 
shipping costs-in the spring of 1801. 35 The fact that Niagara prices ex-
31. Douglas McCALLA, "Wheat Prices in Upper Canada, 1786-1841" (paper presented 
to the 12th Conference on the Application of Quantitative Methods to Canadian Economic 
History, Edmonton, October 1982). Niagara data given there for 1808, 1809, 181l are revised 
on the basis of PAC, MG 24, I-26, vols 17-18, Hamilton Papers, ledgers. An 1801 figure for 
Niagara is estimated on the basis of PAC, M-284-5, Norfolk Historical Society, Noah Fair-
child Accounts. Both additional sources converted from New York currency. 
32. Allan PRED, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information: The United States 
System of Cities, 1790-1840 (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1973), is instruc-
tive on this issue. 
33. For the beginning of shipments downriver in 1793 see Simcoe Correspondence, 
I: 255, Richard Cartwright, Jr, to Simcoe, 12 November 1792 ; PAO, Cartwright Letterbook, 
MS 43, Cartwright to Todd, McGill & Co., 16 and 28 September 1793. 
34. CRAIG, Upper Canada, p. 8. See also Simcoe Correspondence, III, p. 216, Simcoe 
to Lord Dorchester, 10 December 1794. 
35. PAO, Cartwright letterbook transcripts, MS 44, V, pp . 76, 80, 105-7; Richard 
Cartwright Jr to Hon. John McGill, 28 February 1801, to John & Jas McGregor, 14 May 1801, 
to Robert Hamilton, 30 January 1802. 
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ceeded those on the St Lawrence until 1800 confirms anecdotal evidence 
that it was only near the end of the first twenty years of development that 
districts at the west end of Lake Ontario, let alone farther west, participat-
ed directly in exports of Upper Canada's wheat staple. 36 Earlier, the 
momentum of development in western areas (which by 1805-06 included 
half the province's population) clearly was not directly generated by wheat 
grown for export. · 
Upper Canada was always known as a high cost, high wage economy, 
and this is not difficult to comprehend in light of its distance from the sea. 
How to view the cost and wage problem from a farmer's point of view, 
given how much he provided for himself, or from the wage-earner's per-
srective, is less clear, of course, than for the salaried officials whose 
complaints are easiest to come by. It is striking even so that for extended 
periods (1793-95, 1803-04) the prevailing price for Upper Canada's primary 
crop in its most populous agricultural area was no more than 3s. (~) per 
bushel, a figure at or near all-time lows for the commodity anywhere 
around Lake Ontario. By contrast, the high prices of 1796-99 must have 
yielded considerable rewards for the already established wheat farmers. 
That such high prices were associated with local (and cross-lake) demand 
attributable to rapid immigration and helped to draw further immigration 
was certainly assumed at the time. 37 There is also, as we shall see below 
(Table 4), evidence of new higher levels of supply being attained in the 
wake of the two wheat price peaks (1789-90, 1796-99). 38 Such evidence 
offers clues as to how such cyclical patterns affected farmers' incomes and 
the expectations of both farmers and intending immigrants. As regards the 
low-price stage of the cycle, at present it seems safe only to say first that, 
given the population data above, low prices did not, for long if at all, put a 
stop to immigration, and second that, given the evidence we have on per-
sistence, many farmers found it possible to survive the low prices in some 
manner. 39 It should be possible to learn something of how the successful 
farmers coped in such apparently difficult times. This is another subject to 
return to below, when the structure of agriculture and the workings of the 
provincial business system are considered. 
III 
One component of Upper Canada's early economic survival was, 
plainly, the financial support of the British government, provided in various 
36. Regarding such implications of price series, see T.J.A. LEGOFF, "The Agri-
cultural Crisis in Lower Canada, 1802-12: A Review of a Controversy", Canadian Historical 
Review , LV (1974): 10-16. See also FIRTH, The Town of York, pp. xxxix, !iii. 
37. PAC, MG 11, microfilm of the Colonial Office Records, CO 42/325/317-28, 
J. Elmsley to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, 6 August 1800. 
38. For the significance of such price peaks, see SHEPHERD and WALTON, Shipping , 
Maritime Trade, p. 20. On Upper Canada from 1796-1800, see H. G.J. AITKEN, The Weiland 
Canal Company (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 17. 
39. On the significance of persistence, see ELLIOTT, '"The Famous Township of 
Hull"', pp. 344-45; Norris , "Household and Transiency" , pp. 409-15. 
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ways. Perhaps the largest single payment was for claims by the Loyalists 
for their losses. Upper Canadian residents were awarded between £100,000 
and £160,000 sterling, paid out between 1789 and 1795, though paid in a 
form that would enable a recipient to discount the entire award in 1789. 40 
The economy had, of course, already survived for several years when 
these sums were paid, but even so the funds must have helped to make up 
for lost capital, to underwrite early imports to the colony, and to contribute 
substantially to capital formation. 
Over the longer term other more regular and relatively predictable 
types of British expenditure made within the province were probably of 
more importance to the economy. These included half-pay to retired army 
officers (of whom 110 remained as late as 1807) ;41 army purchases of 
Upper Canadian flour and pork, along with modest quantities of some other 
items; 42 annual salaries of Indian Department officers resident in Upper 
Canada; 43 the annual British parliamentary grant for the support of the 
civil administration of the colony ; 44 some other civil expenses ; 45 and a 
wide range of largely military expenditures, both for routine operations and 
for capital works, that would have been spent on Upper Canadian goods and 
services. 46 Except for the last two all of these are subject to relatively 
clear calculation. While data are available on garrison sizes, my research 
has not yet indicated in any very detailed way what it cost to keep the 
40. Howard TEMPERLEY, "Frontierism, Capital, and the American Loyalists in 
Canada", Journal of American Studies, XIII (1979): 15-18. 
41. Ibid., pp. 18-22. By 1810, £5,400 per year was being paid to ex-officers. See also 
CANADA, Report on Canadian Archives for 1892, pp. 375-77, for a list of half-pay officers in 
1807. 
42. Metropolitan Toronto Library (hereafter MTL), John McGill Papers, "Commis-
sariat and Government Returns", passim . See also vols B-38 to B-42; and PAO, Cartwright 
letterbook transcripts, MU 500, account of Upper Canada exports, etc. in 1803. 
43. Russell Correspondence, II, p. 53, "Proposed Establishment of the Indian Depart-
ment for 1798". See also PAC, MG 11, microfilm of the Colonial Office Records, CO 42/350/ 
130, establishment for the Indian Department in Upper Canada for 1810. 
44. Simcoe Correspondence, IV, p. 167, estimate of Upper Canada civil establishment 
for 1795 ; V, p. 139, John King to Simcoe, 5 May 1795. Russell Correspondence , III, p. 44, 
John King to Russell, 3 January 1799; PAC, MG 11 , microfilm of the Colonial Office records, 
CO 42/336/123 and 337/167, Peter Hunter to E. Cooke, 6 October 1804 and 24 June 1805. 
45. Simcoe Correspondence, II, p. 134, Peter Russell to Simcoe, 17 January 1794; 
Russell Correspondence, I. pp. 152, 204, 269-70, 303, Peter Russell to Robert Prescott, 
28 February, 3 July, 3 September, 13 October 1797; UCJ, 5 March 1817, Lieutenant-Governor's 
Message , printed in OBA, Ninth Report (1912), pp. 350-51. 
46. On garrison size and composition, see MTL, John McGill Papers, "Commissariat 
and Government Returns", J. Craigie estimates of provisions required, 12 April 1804 and 
8 April 1805; PAC, RG 8-I, 546/74, proposed distribution of new bedding , 12 August 1797 ; 
PAC, MG ll, microfilm of the Colonial Office records, CO 42/330/78 and 336/32, John 
Craigie's estimates of provisions, 28 August 1802, 6 August 1803. Expenditures under this 
category would have included pay and allowances and a wide range of goods and services ; 
this estimate is quite notional, but if one bears in mind that headquarters were in Lower 
Canada, as were two-thirds of the forces in the Canadas, it is possible to guess that not more 
than one-third of British costs under this heading can have been incurred in Upper Canada. 
If Castlereagh is to be believed (note 47 below), something like £120,000 per year was a maxi-
mum level of expenditures in the early years of the century, and I have assumed that slightly 
less than one-third of such a figure was the likely maximum expenditure within Upper Canada. 
It will be clear how approximate is such an estimate. 
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usual force in Upper Canada functioning. Given the significance of this 
item in the overall extent of British expenditure, this is rather disappointing. 
Table 3 summarizes my estimates of annual British government expendi-
tures in the province. The total figure may be compared to C. P. Stacey's 
suggestion that the defence of Upper and Lower Canada cost about £260,000 
per year in 1800 (but also with Lord Castlereagh's assertion that expendi-
tures at this level in 1808-09 were unprecedentedly high). 47 
Table 3 Annual British Government Expenditures 
in Upper Canada, c. 1795-c. 1805 
Estimated Expense 
Item Minimum Maximum 
Half-pay 6,000* 10,000 
Purchase of army provisions 
(mainly flour and pork) 5,000 8,000 
Salaries, Indian Department 3,000 3,000 
British parliamentary grant 
for civil administration 7,000 8,000 
Estimated overrun** beyond 
parliamentary grant 3,000 5,000 
Garrison-related expenditures*** 
within Upper Canada 25,000 35,000 
Total in £ sterling 49,000 69,000 
Approximate total in £ currency 54,000 77,000 
Sources: See notes 41-46. 
* Higher figure applies to earlier years, lower to later years. 
* * The existence of this category of expense is at present easier to document than is the 
actual amount. 
*** Based on an estimation of £25 to £35 per man, for an average garrison of 1,000. 
Such military expenditures represented the largest single source of 
outside income for the economy. They were not simply a net addition to 
the capital available for economic development, however, because they 
must have affected Upper Canada's demand for imports, local price levels, 
and allocation of resources in the province. Moreover, as there was little 
tendency for the overall total of such expenditures to grow, at least until 
after 1806, as preparations for war mounted, it is difficult to argue from 
this evidence that these outlays constituted the economy's dynamic ele-
ment, that is, the force that directly and particularly propelled its growth. 
And on a per capita basis such expenditures declined relatively rapidly 
47. C. P. STACEY, Canada and the British Army 1846-1871, rev. ed. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1%3), p. 11 ; but see PAC, RG 8-1 , Royal Army Records, 
327/188-90, Castlereagh to Sir James Craig, 8 September 1809, which speaks of " the very 
great increase of Expences" in the past eighteen months , the total expenditure for the period 
being £372 ,000 sterling, which implies an annual rate of c. £250,000. It was noted that such 
expenditures exceeded "the proportionate Expence in any former year to such an Amount 
that I am unavoidably obliged to desire ... a detailed explanation .. . . " 
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with the growth of population. By the end of the period under considera-
tion here, 1805-06, the maximum total of c. £69,000 sterling was the equiva-
lent of £77,000 currency, that is £1 13s. currency per capita or £10 ($40) 
per household. How to judge the significance of such a figure is something 
to be further considered below. 48 
IV 
Such British expenditures, as the equivalent of exports in their 
provision of foreign exchange, need also to be seen in the context of Upper 
Canada's external trade in general. Surviving data on Upper Canada's 
imports are not easy to interpret: separating its share of imports from those 
destined for the fur trade, the United States, the military, and the Indians 
is impossible, and in any case figures for all but a few specifically dutiable 
commodities are provided only by bulk and without differentiation. 49 
Changes in duty levels and customs practice and sharp year-to-year fluctua-
tions in volumes of separately itemized imports further complicate the 
matter. Moreover, in connection with its arguments with Lower Canada 
about the division of customs revenues, Upper Canada clearly documented 
a variety of failings and inconsistencies in the system of recording trade 
at the Coteau-du-Lac customs house. 50 Somewhat equivalent problems 
arise in analyzing data on the export trades. Thus, the most useful data 
derive from the information gathered by the colony's leading merchant, 
Richard Cartwright, Jr, regarding the export trade passing through Kings-
ton (Table 4). Though he made some comprehensive provincial estimates, 
most of his evidence necessarily omitted material on the two easterly 
districts. 
Despite their limitations, these data indicate volumes and values for 
Upper Canada's domestically produced exports at intervals from 1794 to 
1803. They reveal a developing locational pattern in the production of 
export commodities, with the eastern districts already showing relative 
strength in wood products. 51 The continuing significance of furs is also 
apparent, though to the extent that this reflected a trade on Lower Canadian 
48. Several contexts might be suggested here. One author suggests on the basis of 
accounts data that average family outlay in one pre-1812 western New York community was 
$68 per year; E . V. WILCOX, "Living High on $67.77 A Year", New York History, VII (1926): 
195-204. Edith FIRTH (The Town of York, p. lxxvi) suggests that "a modest house" at York 
cost £625 currency in 1803 , and this serves at least to point the contrast between the rural and 
the incipient urban social and economic structures of the province . At the average price of 
wheat at Kingston in the 1795-1804 period ($1.00 per bushel), such governmental outlays 
would have equalled the equivalent of something like forty bushels of wheat per household per 
year (i.e., the produce of about two acres of land). 
49. For example, PAC, MG 11, microfilm of the Colonial Office Records, CO 42/328/ 
143-70, Accounts of articles passing Coteau-du-Lac upwards, I January to 30 June, 1 July to 
31 December 1800. 
50. For example, UCJ, 14 March 1814, 26 March 1816, printed in OBA, Ninth Report 
(1912), pp. 153, 286-87. 
51. On the development of the timber trade before 1805, see A.R.M. LOWER, Great 
Britain's Woodyard (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), p. 62. 
Table 4 Exports of Upper Canadian Produce to Lower Canada, 
Selected Data, 1794-1803 
Exporting Area 
Midland district• 
Upper Canada from 
Midland district west 
All Upper Canada 
(estimated volume) 
All Upper Canada 
(estimated value)f 
Year 
1794 
1800 
1801 
1802 
1803C 
1797 
1801 
Wheat and Flour 
Value Volume 
3,100 
8,400 4,700 
24,000 14,000 
11,400b 
18,000 16,200 
26,700 
Description of Items 
Pork Potash 
Value Volume Value Volume 
0 0 300 
2,100 430 
2,000 500 
200 800 
6,200 1,500 2,000 530 
670d 
2,300 
Staves and Timber Total 
Value Quantity Value 
3,400 
1,000 12,100 
27,900 
26,200 
400,000e 
15,600 46,7008 
Sources : Data for 1794 from Simcoe Correspondence, III, p. 223, Richard Cartwright to Simcoe, 15 December 1794; 
data for 1797 from C.E. CARTWRIGHT, ed., The Life and Letters of the Late Hon. Richard Cartwright (Toronto, 1876), 
p. 76, Richard Cartwright to Davison & Co., 4 November 1797; data for 1800.03 from PAO, Cartwright letterbooks, 
1787-1808, MU 500, transcripts, 137-38, 150-51, 181-82, 206-8, 229-30. For price levels in 1803, see MTL, John McGill 
Papers, vol. B-40, receipts, 25, 27 January 1804. 
Notes: Exports are exclusive of furs . Values are given in Halifax currency. Volumes are expressed in barrels unless 
otherwise specified. Rows may not add because various minor exports items are omitted from table. Where no value, 
volume or quantity is given, data are not available. 
•The only district for which data are available for the year 1794. It contained Upper Canada's leading town, Kingston. 
There were no exports of pork from Midland district. 
b Richard Cartwright Jr estimated that a further 4,000 barrels were exported from the two districts to the east (i.e. 
Eastern and Johnstown). 
c Data on values for 1803 are estimated on the basis of current prices . 
. d Volume was 150 tons. Conversion to barrels from tons of potash is difficult because of variations in barrel size 
(4 to 5 barrels per ton seems to have been usual, and 4.5 has therefore been used here). 
eTotal number of staves. 
f Converted from£ sterling. £1 sterling = $4.444; £1 currency = $4.00. 
8 Furs from east of Detroit represented an additional export value of £40,000 in 1801 . 
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account in which imported goods were exchanged with Indians, the income 
generated by such export volumes would have had Jess impact on Upper 
Canada than equivalent values of products with different local economic 
linkages. The potash trade was of relatively modest weight, though there 
would be later years when it was more significant, and after 1800 it was 
beginning to be economical to market potash from west of Kingston. Sur-
viving data from individual merchants' accounts suggest, though, that the 
average farmer could not expect to earn from this trade much more than a 
few shillings per year (about 7s. to lOs. seems normal) as a by-product of 
burning that he had to do anyway. 52 The emergence of Upper Canadian-
produced pork as an export product is an important dimension of the data 
for 1803, but pork in fact remained a more important product on the internal 
market, and as such will be further discussed below. 
What is striking about the data is that, if furs are omitted, wheat had 
emerged as the province's leading export by 1800-01. The swift response 
to the high Lower Canadian prices of 1801 is very clear, and it would be 
reasonable in many respects to consider that the age of Upper Canada's 
wheat staple had already begun. Data on wheat exports may also be viewed 
on a per capita or per household basis. As 1803 data are for the area from 
the Midland District westward, it is appropriate to estimate the population 
for that area only. Taking the population for the four districts on Lake 
Ontario and arbitrarily reducing it to bring it to a level for 1803, we may 
arrive at an estimated population for the area in 1803 of 22,500. Values for 
wheat and flour fluctuated sharply (and 1802-03 prices were low), but even 
on a volume basis, the 16,200 barrels of flour exported in 1803 are at first \ 
glance relatively unimpressive: equalling 81,000 bushels of wheat, this was 
just 3.6 bushels per capita or 21.6 per household. Such an amount would 
have yielded less than £4 currency per household at a lakeshore port at 
then prevalent prices. 
From this perspective, the earnings generated by British military 
expenditures look rather more respectable. On the other hand, these data 
may be compared to information from later stages of Upper Canada's 
development; 1830 was· probably the peak year by value in Upper Canada's 
wheat exports prior to the 1840s, the equivalent of some 764,000 bushels 
of Upper Canadian wheat passing Coteau-du-Lac that year. 53 With Upper 
Canada's population of 213,000 in 1830, this was again equal to 3.6 bushels 
per capita. At the relatively high prices of that year, this would have 
earned about £5 15s. per six-person household. 54 While suitable standards 
52. PAO, Yonge Mills, Records, MU 3164, Daybook A #4, 1803-04. See also MTL, 
Baldwin Room, Alexander Wood Letter Books, I: 357-58, Wood to Leslie McNaught & Co., 
6 October 1804; MTL, Abner Miles Accounts, "Ledger A, Yonge St, 1805". 
53. Flour converted to wheat at I barrel = 5 bushels. UCJ, 1832-33, Appendix 101, 
Report of Select Committee on Inland Water Communication. See also JoNES, History of 
Agriculture, p. 48, concerning the exceptional level of 1830 exports; Jones' data here include 
American flour sent downriver. 
54. Even if all population east of Kingston is excluded from the 1830 figure, on the 
large assumption that none of the wheat and flour recorded at Coteau-du-Lac came from that 
area, this figure, for an exceptional year, is only five bushels per capita or thirty per house-
hold (equal to £8 per household). 
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of comparison and significance need further consideration, it can be said 
that neither the 1803 nor the 1830 income figure can be construed as large. 
This rather simple comparison also serves to suggest that Upper Canada's 
Lake Ontario region had by 1803 become in per capita terms a wheat 
staple exporting region fully comparable to the standards for any year 
prior to the 1840s. 
Apart from the downriver export trades , of course, it must be remem-
bered that a cross-lakes trade of some significance existed , and Upper 
Canada earned other income from providing services and supplies to the 
inland fur trade. 55 The income from these two sources must not be neg-
lected, but it is not possible at present to arrive at any measure of its scale. 
In some respects , for the cross-lakes trade, it may be analytically simpler 
to treat the matter as an aspect of the internal trade of Upper Canada, 
given the parallel nature of the economies, the relative openness of the 
border, and the absence of effective regulation in the years before the 
early nineteenth century. 
v 
The relative modesty of such staple exports and the indicated ap-
parently modest per-household levels of the province' s foreign exchange 
earnings from trade and government together suggest a need for closer 
examination of the domestic economy, to see something of the flow of such 
funds through it and, more generally, to assist in seeing how the com-
ponents of the province's economic system were integrated. 56 It would be 
easy to model the rural economy in terms of a two-sector model, in which 
the economy consisted essentially of parallel and in a sense competing 
units, each producing for two sectors, one based on the largely self-
sufficient household, the other based on production and sale of an export-
oriented staple commodity. In this case, income earned from exports 
would immediately flow out to purchase imports. But this neglects internal 
exchange and flows of funds within the economy. From the producer's 
point of view, after all , income earned from participation in the domestic 
economy would be as welcome as that earned from external trade ; per-
ceived relative profitability and risk, presumably , determined his allocation 
of his time and his choices of products and markets. 
The significance of the domestic economy can be illustrated by reflect-
ing on the failure of development to occur around fur trade and military 
posts in relatively isolated areas-that is, almost all expenditures on such 
posts went immediately for imported goods and services, any stimulus to 
new growth and investment imparted by such expenditure being felt out-
55. WILSON, " The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton", pp. 133-75. 
56. See also J. T. LEMON, The Best Poor Man 's Country : A Geographical Study of 
Early Southeastern Pennsylvania (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 
pp. 150-83; RoTHENBERG, " The Market and Massachusetts Farmers", pp. 312-13. 
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side the region of the post, not nearby. 57 Because it is so large a problem 
to estimate the scale and mechanisms of the domestic economy, it is ex-
tremely tempting to fall back on analyses based on extra-regional economic 
relations exclusively ; 58 but such a simplification of the research problem 
would not resolve the analytic problems in a very satisfactory way. For 
example, the ability of an economy to extend the internal flow of funds 
could change substantially over time, as must have happened in Upper 
Canada after 1785. That Upper Canadians hoped it would is clearly evi-
denced in the persistent championing by Richard Cartwright, Jr, of home-
produced items, especially Upper Canadian produced and cured pork. 59 
To estimate the scale and nature of the domestic economy, it is 
necessary to begin with agriculture, using available data plus a good deal of 
speculation to sketch an outline of the largest sector of the internal 
Table 5 Estimated Wheat Output for Upper Canada, 
c. 1803 
Item 
Seed requirements 1 
Civilian consumption 2 
Army purchases 3 
Wheat distilled 4 
Wheat exported 5 
Total 
Number of 
Bushels 
110,000 
260,000 
I4,000 
80,000 
8I,OOO 
545,000 
Percentage of 
Total Output 
20 
48 
2 
I5 
I5 
IOO 
1 Yield ratio of seed estimated at I:5; see LEGOFF, "The Agricultural Crisis in Lower Canada'', 
I7-26, where a ratio of I: 5 to I: 6 is suggested. For a contract based on an assumed ratio of 
I :6, see PAO, McMartin Papers, F-2, Receipts, receipt dated 29 March I811, for "twelve 
bushels of wheat for two bushels of wheat that was sowed upon the Land over flowed by the 
mill Dam". 
2 Civilian consumption estimated at 2/J lb of flour per day, the standard army civilian rations, 
which equals I 1/• barrels of flour per person per year. The population in I803 is estimated 
at 4I,400 (1805-06 figure less IO percent). Flour is converted to wheat at 5 bushels per barrel. 
See PAO, Miscellaneous Collection, I783, item 3, Haldimand Papers photostats, estimates 
of Loyalist provisions in 1783-84. See also KELLY, "Wheat Farming in Simcoe County", 
I05-7; MclL WRAITH, "Logistical Geography", p. 53. 
3 PAO, Cartwright letterbooks, 1787-I808, MU 500, transcripts, pp. 206-8, account of Upper 
Canadian exports and provisions supplied to the government in 1803. 
4 PAO, Cartwright letterbooks, 1787-I808, MU 500, transcripts, p. 213, account of stills in 
Upper Canada for the year ending 5 April I804. See also Russell Correspondence, III, 
pp. 112-13, John McGill to James Green, I8 February I799. 
5 See Table 4. 
57. On the significance of local linkages in the development process, see John Mc-
CALLUM, Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and Economic Development in Quebec and 
Ontario until 1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, I980), pp. II5-20. 
58. For example, WALTON and SHEPHERD, The Economic Rise of Early America, 
pp. 3-5. 
59. PAO, Richard Cartwright Letterbook, I793-96, MS 43, Cartwright to George 
Davison, 6 November I793, to Robert Hamilton, 26 January I794, and to John Cragie [sic], 
9 May I795. 
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economy of the province. Such an analysis must begin with the overall 
role of wheat in the economy, for it was without doubt the most important 
single product (Table 5). 60 The significance of the estimated 1803 output of 
5'45,000 bushels can be suggested in various ways. This would have been 
equal to about 12 or 13 bushels per capita, a figure far higher than the 
wheat output recorded in the 1842 census but very much in line with the 
output data given by the censuses of 1848 and 1851. For purposes of the 
present study, it is appropriate, given the usual stress on wheat in this 
economy, to try as in Table 5 to maximize its impact. Thus, if we assume 
that Upper Canada had 6,700 households in 1803 (figure for 1805-06less 10 
percent) and further assume that only half these were significantly engaged 
in wheat farming, 61 we arrive at a per-farm estimate of 163 bushels of out-
put per year (of which about 90 would need to be marketed to supply the 
various demands noted). At the lowest average yield suggested for such 
pioneer conditions, 15 bushels per acre, this would require about 11 acres 
to produce; 62 on the apparently standard wheat-fallow-wheat rotation, this 
would require the farm to have 22 acres available to provide all the wheat 
required. It is usually noted that about two acres would provide a family 
with an adequate garden, and that up to five acres per year was a reasona-
ble rate of clearing. Hence as few as four years might bring a farm to this 
average state of wheat production. Of course by 1803 Upper Canada had 
many farms that had existed for ten or more years, and which must have 
had considerably more acres in crop than this. 
These data can be viewed in gross terms as well. Again at the low 
yield of 15 bushels per acre, some 36,300 acres per year, or 72,600 over 
two years, would suffice to produce such a crop. Available assessment 
data show that in six districts in 1805-06 some 140,000 acres were cultivated 
or "under culture". 63 If we add 40,000 more acres for the Eastern and 
London Districts, Upper Canada's total of land under culture as the tax 
assessors understood the term was at least 180,000 acres in 1805. This 
implies a ratio of improved land to population of about 3.9 to 1, very much 
Upper Canada's long-term average. 64 Even if much clearing had gone on 
60. See MciLWRAITH, "Logistical Geography", pp. 50-90, for an instructive analysis 
for a later period. 
61. David GAGAN, "Geographical and Social Mobility in Nineteenth Century Ontario: 
A Microstudy", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, XIII (1976): 158-59, sug-
gests that something like this figure (51 to 55 percent) was characteristic of Peel County 
during its period of extensive growth in the mid-century. See also GAGAN, Hopeful Travellers 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 109, where something like 60 percent of 
household heads are shown to have been in agriculture. 
62. For this yield figure, see MciLWRAITH, "Logistical Geography", p. 102. The 
more commonly met figure is 21 to 22 bushels per acre; see JoNES, History of Agriculture, 
p. 97; GouRLAY, Statistical Account, p. 291. K. KELLY, "Wheat Farming in Simcoe County 
in the Mid-Nineteenth Century", Canadian Geographer, XV (1971): 95-ll2, is very useful on 
these points. These arguments are consistent with Graeme WYNN, Timber Colony: A His-
torical Geography of Early Nineteenth Century New Brunswick (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1981), p. 21. 
63. See sources for Table l. 
64. On the utility of such assessment data, see R. W. WIDDIS, "Tracing Property 
Ownership in Nineteenth-Century Ontario: A Guide to the Archival Sources", Canadian 
Papers in Rural History, II (1980): 87-88. The equivalent ratios in selected later years were 
3.6:1 in 1830, 3.9:1 in 1851, and 4.4:1 in 1861. 
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since 1803, these figures mean that at most half of the land taxed as under 
cultivation would have been required to produce a wheat crop on the scale 
of that of 1803; of that, only half was needed in each year; and of this 
only a fifth, 7,300 acres, was needed to produce the export portion of the 
province's wheat and the seed to grow it. This extended speculation leads 
to the simple point that we cannot afford to disregard the farmer's work 
on and produce from the remaining 50 to 75 percent of his cleared land. 
Given what was entailed in clearing land, it was obviously intended for 
production of perceived value to the farmer. Certainly these data suggest 
that the usual view of Upper Canadian agriculture as simple export-
focused wheat monoculture may not be appropriate even in this early and 
evidently wheat-oriented era. 65 
The remainder of most farms usually was kept in fodder crops and 
pasturage. It is essential to recall the role of livestock in this economy; as 
assessment rolls indicate well, animals were a substantial part indeed of its 
capital stock. While it is usually said that such animals were "small, rela-
tively unproductive", 66 and left largely to fend for themselves, this point 
needs further examination. All animals that were to be kept over the winter 
needed fodder for the snowy months at least, and animals scheduled for 
slaughter were routinely fattened for a minimum of several weeks. If the 
animals were inferior by the standards of later years or critics of the day, 
this does not mean that they were valueless or unimportant in terms of the 
farmer's time, the resources he devoted to them, or the food, work, hides, 
wool and income he derived from them. 
Of all the animals grown, pigs seem to have been most destined for 
off-farm consumption. After a somewhat unsuccessful try at using Upper 
Canadian pork in the 1790s, the British army increasingly turned again to 
the local product after 1800. From 1804 onward, pork invariably repre-
sented more than half of the army's Upper Canadian provisions purchases 
by value. 67 Moreover, as Table 4 indicates, by this time Upper Canada 
was able at times to export pork into the competitive Lower Canadian 
marketplace. Some further indication of pork's role in the local economy 
can be gathered from the store accounts of Richard Cartwright, Jr, at 
Kingston (for 1791-96) and of Robert Hamilton at Queenston (1806-12); 
because both were important military suppliers of pork, double-counting 
is perh~.ps entailed here, but it is still worth noting (given their involve-
ment also in wheat supply for the forces) that over the respective periods 
each took pork in payment from customers equal in value to half of the 
wheat taken in over the same period. 68 If other merchants had anything 
65. LEMON, The Best Poor Man's Country, pp. 150-83, is instructive here, as are 
M. MciNNIS, "The Changing Structure of Canadian Agriculture, 1867-1897", JEH, XLII 
(1982): 198; and J. O'MARA, "The Seasonal Round of Gentry Farmers in Early Ontario: A 
Preliminary Analysis", Canadian Papers in Rural History, II (1980): 103-12. 
66. KELLY , "Wheat Farming in Simcoe County", p. 97. 
67. MTL, John McGill Papers, Commissariat and Government Returns. See also PAC, 
RG 8-1 , 546/117-18, Charles Long to J. G. Simcoe, 7 July 1795; PAC, MG 11, microfilm of the 
Colonial Office records, CO 42/330/78, Estimate of Provisions, 1802 to 1804. 
68. Queen's University Archives, Kingston, Ontario, Richard Cartwright Papers, 
Additions, vol. I, Ledger, 1791-98; PAC, Hamilton Papers, MG 241-26, vols 17-18. 
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like equivalent experience, it would be possible to begin to build an argu-
ment for pork as a second farm staple, albeit one sold more within than 
outside the province, but it is probably unwise to pursue the speculation 
that far. 
More significantly, other farm-produced goods and services could 
find local markets in varying degrees ; accounts and anecdotal evidence 
abound on the sale of firewood, of teaming services, of hides, of hay, and 
of a wide range of other products. In periods of rapid immigration, new 
arrivals constituted valuable additions to local markets. Even the classic 
farmer's bee, as Norman Ball's excellent thesis on land clearing demon-
strates, involved a complex and well-understood pattern of exchanges 
rather than simple neighbourliness. 69 Thus in rural areas even as in small 
villages and the slightly larger towns that were the commercial centres 
of this economy, the buying and selling of goods and services was well-
established. It is hard to estimate the scale of this activity by comparison 
with production for the household and for export, but it is not legitimate to 
ignore its role. This point will be more fully understood if we tum to con-
sideration of Upper Canada's commercial system and in particular the role 
in it of debt, credit, and the investment process. 
VI 
In the standard interpretation of Upper Canada's early economic 
experience, based directly on policy documents of the time, two themes 
stand out starkly in regard to the business system and its development 
problems. One is that the colony suffered from a shortage of capital in 
general and of a circulating medium in particular. 70 The other is that as a 
result it was characterized by ubiquitous and excessive debt. Evidence of 
both themes is not hard to come by, and the second in particular has often 
been cast in highly coloured terms; as one writer puts it, the "need of 
capital to develop [land] caused [the settlers] to become hopelessly in-
debted to the frequently denounced 'Shopkeeper Aristocracy' and even-
tually to lose their land". 71 This, however, is more the stuff of romantic 
melodrama than of economic history. Certainly it makes one wonder why 
immigrants, unless extraordinarily ill-informed or unintelligent, would 
continue to choose such a colony if such shortages and problems were as 
absolute as accounts like this imply, or were perceived as impossible 
barriers to overcome. It makes more sense to assume that immigrants saw 
relative opportunities in Upper Canada that more than compensated for 
69. Norman BALL, "The Technology of Settlement and Land Clearing in Upper 
Canada Prior to 1840" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1979), pp. 184-92. 
70. For example, UCJ, 5 March 1817, petition from Thomas Markland and others; 
OBA, Ninth Report (1912), p. 352. 
71. Lillian GATES, Land Policies of Upper Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1968), p. 43. Compare Leo JOHNSON, "The Settlement of the Western District", p. 23: 
"the new settlers ... soon found themselves hopelessly in debt to the much denounced 
'Shopkeeper Aristocracy'. " See also Richard PRESTON, Kingston Before the War of 1812 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Champlain Society, 1959), p. lxx. 
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these predictable problems of currency and capital. And as historians have 
often failed to understand, it was quite normal and rational to borrow in 
order to progress and develop. 72 As the abundant evidence that it was 
possible to succeed as a farmer in Upper Canada indicates, however 
inevitable debt might be, it was not inevitable to be entrapped by debt. 
This point and the economy's growing success do not, of course, 
mean that hopes of success were necessarily borne out by actual results. 
As the evidence of transiency and the ability of some speculators to 
acquire large holdings of land, including much originally granted to 
Loyalists, both confirm, individuals might well fail as farmers; and capital 
shortage might prove a key barrier to individuals' success. Terms such as 
"lack" and "shortage" are relative, not absolute, however. As the stress 
by contemporaries on the problems of capital and credit indicates, there 
was a gap between expectations and ambitions on the one hand and actual 
resources that could be immediately commanded on the other, and the 
economy encountered recurring cyclical payments problems. But it is in 
fact striking that this economy was well able to develop, through ordinary 
business channels, many of the facilities it required-often indeed to 
temporary or even long-term (apparently in the case of distilleries) excess 
capacity. After early reliance on government-supplied shipping, Upper 
Canadians increasingly developed privately owned vessels. 73 Similarly, 
saw and grist mills were built in abundance, only a few of the early ones 
requiring government involvement. By 1805, in the six districts for which 
data are available, there were at least 185 saw and/or grist mills, and there 
must have been at least thirty or forty more in the other two (the Eastern 
and London Districts). 74 That most (but not all) were small and simple by 
later standards, and often had trouble maintaining what critics and out-
siders saw as high enough standards of quality, is less significant than that 
they existed at all. Many other examples could be cited here, from rental 
housing in towns to artisan shops, breweries, asheries, carding mills, etc. 75 
Even the development of local roads (invariably the subject of complaint) 
was something that could be financed and organized gradually, as settle-
ment progressed and the economy grew. 76 That is, there were kinds of 
capital formation that this economy could manage quite readily, when 
72. See on this point Julian GwYN's excellent review of GAGAN's Hopeful Travel-
lers inHS-SH, XV (1982): 522-27. 
73. For example, PAO, Matthew Dolsen Journal, 1797-1799, which includes accounts 
for the construction of the schooner Thames; PAO, Cartwright Letterbook, MS 43, Cartwright 
to Robert Hamilton, 15 and 18 April 1794, on capital cost of new schooner Simcoe. 
74. See sources for Table 1. See also R. L. GENTILCORE, "The Beginnings of Settle-
ment in the Niagara Peninsula (1782-1792)", Canadian Geographer, VII (1%3): 79; and 
M. Q. INNIS, "The Industrial Development of Ontario, 1783-1820", reprinted in Historical 
Essays on Upper Canada, ed.: J. K. JoHNSON, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 
p. 141. 
75. For the capitalization of an early brewery, see MTL, Alexander Wood Letter 
Books, 1/101-2, Wood to James Richardson, 11 January 1802; and to Joseph Forsyth, 
11 January 1802. For a blacksmith's operations, see PAO, Niagara Historical Society Records, 
James Cooper account book, MS 193, reel 5, 1806-27. 
76. T.F. MclLWRAITH, "The Adequacy of Rural Roads in the Era before Railways: 
An Illustration from Upper Canada", Canadian Geographer, XIV (1970): 354-58. 
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appropriate returns could be anticipated on such investments. 77 If lumpy 
investments, such as canals would later be, were another matter, and if 
ambitions very often outstripped current finances, that should not blind us 
to the fact that this was an economic system well able to develop and 
maintain many of the fixed capital facilities that were most obviously 
relevant to its stage of development. 78 
The shortage of specie that this economy felt revealed the colony's 
propensity to import more than it exported, and its consequent tendency 
to run a deficit on its current trade balance. But of course specie exchanges 
are far from the only mode of financial settlement. Indeed, in such a 
colonial economy, a great deal of the domestic trade was conducted on 
credit through the ledgers and account books of the often-denounced 
merchants, and also of artisans, professionals, and even farmers. 79 Such 
an economy had to be relatively local, or (like eighteenth-century trades 
generally) extended along chains of personal connections, because it was 
necessary to have some basis of trust for the system to function. As was 
noted above, much Upper Canadian trade and exchange was local. For 
goods and services exchanged within an area, promises to pay could serve 
almost as readily as actual payment, provided there was a rough equili-
brium among the local transactions over a period of time. Even net sums 
due when accounts were periodically drawn up were not necessarily 
required to be paid, but could be carried forward; or debts could, perhaps, 
be capitalized in some way, leaving only interest to be paid. 80 In such a 
local economy, some would, ultimately, be net gainers, even without 
necessarily participating directly in export or staples trades, whether by 
harder work, greater skill, superior land or financial resources, greater 
frugality, better judgment, or just luck; and it would be they who tended 
to accumulate assets, to survive economically, and thus to be able to 
persist through the troughs of the economy's recurrent cycles of low 
prices or credit stringency. In short, it is evident that in Upper Canada 
there were ways around what are sometimes termed "the glaring evils of 
the truck system", 81 and this may even lead one to wonder whether the 
often-denounced system of store credit as such was the cause of the 
problems usually attributed to it, or whether other, contextual, matters 
were more central. 
77. On the impact of low wheat prices on mill profitability, see UCJ, 16 February 
1804, petition from sundry millers; printed in OBA, Sixth Report (1909), p. 431. 
78. One authority goes so far as to suggest that there was no capital shortage at all 
before 1812; see H. C. PENTLAND, "The Role of Capital in Canadian Economic Develop-
ment before 1875", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XVI (1950): 459. 
79. For examples of relatively modest shops and artisans in this process (a shoemaker 
and a tanner respectively), see MTL, Abner Miles Accounts, Ledger A 1805, and PAO, 
Seneca Ketchum Account Book, MU 597, 1807-32. 
80. On this process, see EGNAL, "Economic Development in the American Colonies", 
pp. 214-17. 
81. H. A. INNIS, The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy, rev. 
ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), p. 282. For recent revisions of the account 
of such credit systems in a Maritime context, see WYNN, Timber Colony, p. 200, n. 54; and 
David ALEXANDER, "Literacy and Economic Development in Nineteenth Century New-
foundland", Acadiensis, X (Autumn 1980): 6. 
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The leading import-export merchants were at the centre of this 
system, but scarcely had the monopolistic power over prices and credit 
that their contemporary and their latter day critics have attributed to 
them. 82 The wide fluctuations in prices, the high rate of turnover in com-
merce, and the possibility of failure faced even by the most powerful offer 
ample testimony to the competitiveness of colonial trade. 83 The high prices 
complained of in Upper Canada reflected real costs associated with the 
risks and uncertainties of doing business in this setting. The merchants 
were, however, the point at which the local system met the external 
commercial world, and they had to meet external debts, or at least be 
able to continue to carry them. To meet their external obligations, they 
needed cash (specie or any acceptable bank notes), produce that could be 
sold outside the colony, credits built up by provision of services within 
Upper Canada to outsiders (notably through the fur trade), bills of ex-
change drawn for any of the various governmental expenditures, or any 
private bills that might be available from those with assets outside the 
province. The example of Quetton St George's payments in 1807 to his 
six main suppliers illustrates one balance here: well-located in the govern-
mental centre of York, he was able to secure bills to cover 77 percent of 
his payments, against 15 percent by produce and 6 percent by cash. 84 
In expansionary times, that is, when outlooks were optimistic, mer-
chants could evidently count on considerable tolerance and flexibility from 
their external creditors; and this, together with the expanding credit that 
accompanied increased trade volumes, explains the tendency for their 
indebtedness to grow. 85 Their problems were altogether different when 
the economy contracted and they were called upon to pay. Then the 
economy's real exchange problem, the lack of external liquidity, asserted 
itself. Although failure might then result at points along the credit chain, in 
fact this did not remove actual productive facilities from the economy; 
thus, it was able, when more propitious conditions returned, to renew its 
growth. In effect, the external and even the internal liquidity problem 
meant that most of those who came to Upper Canada found that their as-
sets, once committed to the economy, tended to become fixed and difficult 
to extract except at what seemed too large a discount. Ultimately, the 
value of the country's farms and other facilities depended on their pre-
dicted real earning power. This must have fluctuated even more widely 
82. UCJ, 15 March 1808, petition of inhabitants of Prince Edward County; printed 
in OBA, Eighth Report (1911), p. 271. Simcoe Correspondence, I, pp. 272-74, John McGill 
to J . G. Simcoe, 8 January 1793. For an excellent account of the complex realities faced by 
early merchants, see T. W. AcHESON, "John Baldwin: Portrait of a Colonial Entrepreneur" , 
Ontario History, LXI (1969): 153-66. 
83. WILSON, " The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton", pp. 47,322-30. FIRTH, The Town 
of York, p. Ivi. 
84 . PAO, Baldwin Papers , MS 88 , Quetton StGeorge accounts for 1807 and 1808 (a 
number of accounts with J. & A. McGill, J. Walton, David David, W. & A. Porteous, John 
Blackwood, Despard & Thomas). 
85. PAO, Cartwright Letterbook transcripts, MS 44, III, pp. 201-3, 281-82 ; V, 
pp. 17-18, 107; Richard Cartwright Jr to Todd & McGill, 3 February 1786 ; to J. & A. McGill, 
9 October 1798, 28 August 1799, and 17 February 1802. 
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than the actual flow of earnings would have justified, episodes of high 
prices tending to validate optimistic predictions, and periods of tight credit 
graphically dramatizing the problem of illiquidity. It is impressive, finally, 
that such fluctuations, arising from external influences on the economy and 
its own internal forces, could even at so early a stage be absorbed by the 
Upper Canadian economic system in such a way that its growth, if periodi-
cally slowed, was not arrested. 
VII 
By 1800-05, then, the economy of Upper Canada had taken on 
aspects of the structure that would characterize it for most of the next 
fifty years. This was evidenced in its rate of population growth, the ap-
pearance of a trade cycle that reflected outside market conditions, the 
ratio of land under culture to population, the primacy of wheat, per capita 
levels of wheat output and exports, and the apparent beginnings of at 
least some regional economic specialization (as indicated by the Eastern 
District's greater reliance on wood product exports). The internal economy 
already played an important part in the overall workings of the system ; 
in light of frequent misunderstandings, it is necessary to re-emphasize that 
it was not based on barter but on credit-that is, on bargains not in units of 
work or of commodities but based on time and priced in monetary terms 
(and involving interest charges, implicitly or explicitly). Nor was this, 
properly speaking, a subsistence economy, given its dynamic, if extensive, 
growth, the net immigration to it, its ability to survive harvest and market 
fluctuations, its ability to build up and hold stocks of relevant commodities, 
and its apparent responsiveness to changing market conditions. 86 
The various components of this economy were already part of an 
overall system, in which external commercial credit, immigrant invest-
ments, 87 British government expenditures, and export earnings were the 
links to the outside world. Even by 1800, all these factors, plus domestic 
investment and exchange, were involved in imparting the momentum of 
development to the economy. Practically, it is clear, the development that 
occurred was produced by the people who actually came to Upper Canada, 
invested their time and resources there, and gradually built an agricultural 
economy where none had been before. While we cannot know their mo-
tives individually or in detail, we can nevertheless surmise something about 
them. Given the apparently modest incomes their produce must often have 
earned, and the likelihood that they routinely operated in debt, there is 
much to be said for the view that their key objective must have been to 
acquire not income, as we might define it, but wealth, as measured in 
terms of a productive, long-term income-earning farm with a capital value 
86. See, for example, Simcoe Correspondence, IV , pp. 263-64, John McGill to Sim-
coe, 13 May 1796. 
87 . Simcoe Correspondence, III, pp. 55-56, Simcoe to the Committee ... for Trade 
and Plantations, 1 September 1794. ELLIOTT, " 'The Famous Township of Hull"' , pp. 343 , 
347. 
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that could be expected to grow as the economy did, whether or not staple 
exports grew rapidly. 88 
On this basis, one can argue that this economy was not merely begun 
by but; in a sense, made by the Loyalist settlers. Whether by choice or 
necessity they came, stayed, and made the farms, artisan shops, and other 
productive assets of the country. If officials and many of the dominant 
merchants were not Loyalists , 89 the other initial elements of the economy 
nevertheless were. And the later settlers, who came so largely through the 
private process of immigration, must have been drawn in part by the ap-
parent success that the Loyalists had begun to make of it. As a 
qualification here, it needs always to be recalled that had they not come, 
someone else surely would have, probably within ten to fifteen years, if the 
New York example is to be accepted as a model. Given the significance of 
the theme of persistence and transiency, however, it is clear that the earlier 
(pre-1796 at least in Adolphustown) settlers were particularly likely to be 
successful-and this suggests the importance, to themselves especially, 
of their founding role in the economy. 90 If we approach this economy 
through hindsight and anachronism, as so many have done, we will not 
well understand the system that had been built up by and after them, nor 
will we adequately credit the accomplishment of the first generation of 
Upper Canadian farmers, artisans, and merchants in creating a new 
economy in the backwoods. 
88. See H . J. MAYs , "'A Place to Stand': Families, Land and Permanence in Toronto 
Gore Township, 1820-1890", CANADIAN HISTORICAL AssOCIATION, Historical Papers , Mont-
real 1980, pp. 188-90. 
89. WILSON, "The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton", p. 348. 
90. NORRIS, "Household and Transiency" , pp. 409-11; MAYs, " 'A Place to Stand'" , 
pp . 189-90. 
